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Robotic Speakers and Human Listeners
Helen Norton*
In their forthcoming book, Ron Collins and David Skover propose
that we do—and should—protect speech not so much because of its value
to speakers but instead because of its affirmative value to listeners.
Defining and describing that value very broadly as “utility,” they then
conclude that robotic speech deserves the First Amendment’s coverage,
and often its protection, precisely because of its great utility to listeners:
It should be immaterial to free speech treatment that a robot is not a
human speaker. It should be irrelevant that a robot cannot fairly be
characterized as having intentions. It should be beside the point that
a robot does not engage in a dialogic exchange to express
propositions or opinions. For constitutional purposes, what really
matters is that the receiver experiences robotic speech as meaningful
and potentially useful or valuable.1

In earlier work (first with Toni Massaro2 and then with Toni and
Margot Kaminski3), my co-authors and I similarly concluded that little in
First Amendment law poses a barrier to First Amendment coverage of
robotic speech. Although this conclusion feels counterintuitive to many, it
stems much more from the contemporary state of First Amendment law
than from the nature of robots or artificial intelligence (AI) themselves.4
Indeed, most “positive” free speech theories value, and thus urge the
protection of, expression because it provides certain affirmative benefits
* Professor and Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Chair in Constitutional Law, University of Colorado School of
Law. Thanks to the Seattle University Law Review for their terrific symposium on Singularity: AI and
the Law and to David Skover, Bruce Johnson, and the Symposium’s attendees for their thoughtful
comments.
1. RONALD COLLINS & DAVID SKOVER, ROBOTICA: SPEECH RIGHTS & ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 42 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2018).
2. Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Siri-ously? Free Speech Rights and Artificial Intelligence,
110 NW. U. L. REV. 1169, 1193 (2016).
3. Toni M. Massaro, Helen Norton & Margot E. Kaminski, Siri-ously 2.0: What Artificial
Intelligence Reveals About the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2481, 2523 (2017).
4. See id. at 2512 (explaining that “the Court’s contemporary free speech theory and doctrine
already make it difficult to articulate convincing limiting principles”).
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to listeners: expression can facilitate listeners’ democratic selfgovernance, it can enlighten them through exposure to a marketplace of
ideas and knowledge, and it can inform their choices and thus enable the
exercise of their individual autonomy.5 Even “negative” free speech
theory, which emphasizes the dangers of the government’s control of
expression rather than the affirmative value of that speech in its own right,
seeks primarily to protect listeners from the government.6 In short, both
positive and negative free speech theories (as well as the Supreme Court’s
contemporary First Amendment doctrine that draws upon them) protect
“listeners’ interests in free speech outputs—rather than speakers’
humanness or humanity—in ways that make it exceedingly difficult to
place AI speakers beyond the First Amendment’s reach.”7
So, if we assume that the First Amendment is largely, if not entirely,
about serving listeners’ interests in speech—in other words, that it’s
listeners all the way down—what would a listener-centered approach to
robotic speech require? To be sure, robotic speech can offer great value to
human listeners.8 But here I want to briefly discuss the complicated and
sometimes even dark side of robotic speech from a listener-centered
perspective.
More specifically, cheap and plentiful speech—and robotic speech is
increasingly an important source of cheap and plentiful speech9—is of
great utility to many listeners. But there is a dark side too, as cheap and
plentiful speech sometimes poses new dangers to certain listeners and to
the public more broadly.
Rick Hasen, for example, observes that “[c]heap speech has
dramatically lowered costs for those who want to draw on people’s fears
and rile them up for violent purposes.”10 Julie Cohen uses the term
“infoglut” to describe this era of cheap and plentiful speech fueled by
5. See Massaro & Norton, supra note 2, at 1175–82. Note that one strand of “positive” free
speech theory—that which values speech for its ability to further speakers’ autonomous expression—
provides the exception to the rule that otherwise emphasizes listeners’ interests. Even so, we predicted
that the growing prevalence and value of AI speech would place increasing pressure on this theory to
define and refine its understanding of the speakers entitled to First Amendment protection. See id. at
1180–82.
6. See Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially Worthless
Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (2009) (emphasizing the dangers created by the government’s
efforts to control information rather than any affirmative benefits of expression for its own sake); Paul
Horwitz, The First Amendment’s Epistemological Problem, 87 WASH. L. REV. 445, 451 (2012)
(explaining that a negative theory of the First Amendment is rooted in governmental distrust).
7. Massaro, Norton & Kaminski, supra note 3, at 2483.
8. See Massaro & Norton, supra note 2, at 1170–72 (describing some of the benefits of robotic
speech to human listeners).
9. See Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy), 16
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200, 206–07 (2017).
10. Id.
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technology, along with its attendant and often unanticipated dysfunctions:
“Information abundance also enables new types of power asymmetries
that revolve around differential access to data and to the ability to capture,
store, and process it on a massive scale.”11 And as Tim Wu explains:
It is no longer speech itself that is scarce, but the attention of listeners.
Emerging threats to public discourse take advantage of this
change. . . . The low costs of speaking have, paradoxically, made it
easier to weaponize speech as a tool of speech control. The
unfortunate truth is that cheap speech may be used to attack, harass,
and silence as much as it is used to illuminate or debate.12

Cheap speech, the democratization of information, and infoglut:
these and other terms all describe abundant speech of the sort that robots
and other technological developments increasingly make possible. While
such inexpensive and plentiful speech may seem to maximize listener
utility, the concerns expressed by Cohen, Hasen, and Wu (among others)
show how more speech is not always better for listeners. Indeed,
sometimes speakers “weaponize” cheap speech to threaten listeners—for
example, by exploiting information and power advantages that increase
their capacity to deceive, manipulate, and coerce their listeners.
Speakers’ motives for exploiting listeners are many and complicated:
for example, speakers may seek to entertain themselves (and others), to
make money, or to influence political outcomes.13 Consider, for example,
the evidence that Russian bots targeted the American electorate as part of
a campaign to manipulate the 2016 elections:
Bots can serve many purposes, some beneficent and others
nefarious . . . . Of greatest relevance here, bots can spread
information or misinformation, and can cause topics to “trend” online
through the automated promotion of hashtags, stories, and the like.
During the 2016 campaign, the prevalence of bots in spreading
propaganda and fake news appears to have reached new heights.14

11. Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 369,
384 (2016) (“Under conditions of infoglut, the problem is not scarcity but rather the need for new
ways of cutting through the clutter, and the re-siting of power within platforms, databases, and
algorithms means that meaning is easily manipulated.”).
12. TIM WU, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST., IS THE FIRST AMENDMENT OBSOLETE? 2–3
(2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/Emerging%20Threats%20Tim%
20Wu%20Is%20the%20First%20Amendment%20Obsolete.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3W3-22HM].
13. See Helen Norton, (At Least) Thirteen Ways of Looking at Election Lies, 71 OKLA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (identifying a wide range of motives underlying certain speakers’ lies to their
listeners).
14. Nathaniel Persily, Can Democracy Survive the Internet?, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2017, at 63,
70, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/07_28.2_Persily%20%28web%29.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7PJ8-85YR].
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Tim Wu points to China to further illustrate how speakers can exploit
cheap and abundant speech, or “infoglut,” to threaten listeners’ interests:
“What [researchers] have discovered is a regime less intent on stamping
out forbidden content, but instead focused on distraction, cheerleading,
and preventing meaningful collective action.”15
Furthermore, sometimes listeners themselves are a threat to other
listeners. Indeed, listeners’ interests—both short- and long-term—often
conflict. Trolling provides an illustration. As Whitney Phillips explains,
“[T]rolling can be nasty, outrageous business. That is, in fact, the entire
exercise: to disrupt and upset as many people as possible, using whatever
linguistic or behavioral tools are available.”16 Although the trolls’ targets
find this speech of no value and often of great harm, some number of the
trolls’ listeners include other members of the trolling community who
consider trolling to be enjoyable precisely because others find it so
unpleasant. As I have written elsewhere: “[T]hat the nasty and pernicious
features of certain speech can strip it of utility for some listeners is
precisely why other listeners enjoy it . . . . Those who are quick to see
utility in contested speech may well be those least likely to experience,
and thus see, its harm.”17 Relatedly, different listeners experience hate
speech in different ways and thus disagree about its value. Even though
hate speech is of no utility to its targets, some bystanders apparently enjoy
it. Indeed, many listeners enjoy hateful, false, and outrageous speech when
it speaks to and confirms their pre-existing preferences, fears, and
grievances.18
So far, I have discussed the dark side of robotic speech for its human
listeners. I next consider what it would mean to take listeners’ interests
seriously in the context of robotic and other technologically cheap and
plentiful speech.
Contemporary First Amendment theory and doctrine make clear that
we sometimes privilege listeners’ First Amendment interests by protecting
speech, and sometimes by regulating it.19 At times, for example, the
government imposes duties of honesty, accuracy, or disclosure upon
15. WU, supra note 12, at 10.
16. WHITNEY PHILLIPS, THIS IS WHY WE CAN’T HAVE NICE THINGS: MAPPING THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ONLINE TROLLING AND MAINSTREAM CULTURE 2 (2016).
17. Helen Norton, What’s Old Is New Again (and Vice Versa), in RONALD COLLINS & DAVID
SKOVER, ROBOTICA: SPEECH RIGHTS & ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 100, 107 (Cambridge Univ. Press
2018); see also id. (“[S]ome listeners (as well as speakers) see other listeners simply as means to their
own ends of utility and [] assessments of utility (and harm) can be shaped by the powerful to the
detriment of those less powerful.”).
18. See PHILLIPS, supra note 16, at 10 (describing how trolls enjoy watching each other “ruin[]
complete strangers’ days”).
19. See Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace: Employer Speech and the First
Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 31, 52–60 (2016) (discussing listener-centered speech environments).
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certain speakers to protect listeners’ informational and autonomy interests.
Recall, for instance, the commercial speech context, where listeners’
interests as consumers in receiving truthful and non-misleading
information about legal commercial transactions justify both the
protection and regulation of commercial expression to serve those
interests.20 Consider too the professional speech setting, in which
governments sometimes protect listeners’ interests by prohibiting
professionals’ inaccurate or otherwise harmful speech to their clients and
patients, and by requiring certain truthful disclosures.21
We can similarly understand the First Amendment to protect robotic
speech that is of value to its listeners, while permitting the government to
regulate robotic speech to protect listeners from coercion, deception, and
discrimination. In short, First Amendment doctrine retains a human focus
when it attends both to the value and the dangers of robotic speech to its
human listeners.22
Of course, hard questions remain in determining exactly when and
how to regulate robotic speech to protect listeners’ interests—questions
we will be grappling with for years to come.23 And, to be sure, sometimes
the answer may not be legal regulation, as we may instead choose to rely
on markets, norms, or architecture to protect listeners’ interests.24
But to close with one specific doctrinal proposal, I suggest that we
understand the First Amendment to permit the government to privilege
listeners’ interests by requiring the truthful disclosure of expression’s
robotic origin.25 Expression’s source is extremely valuable information
20. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–64
(1980) (explaining that commercial speech that is false, misleading, or related to illegal activity can
be prohibited outright consistent with the First Amendment because it is of no value to listeners, while
governmental restrictions on all other commercial speech are subject to intermediate scrutiny because
they regulate speech that is of value to listeners).
21. See PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 248–50 (2013) (describing the
regulation of professional and fiduciary speech to protect vulnerable listeners).
22. See Massaro, Norton & Kaminski, supra note 3, at 2523.
23. See id. at 2506–23.
24. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662–64 (1998)
(describing how law, social norms, markets, and architecture can all regulate human behavior in
different ways); see also Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech:
Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1468–84 (2011)
(considering approaches to online hate speech that rely on markets, norms, and architecture).
25. See WU, supra note 12, at 4, 9 (“[G]iven that many of the new speech control techniques
target listener attention, it may be worth reassessing how the First Amendment handles efforts to
promote healthy speech environments and protect listener interests . . . . [N]o one quite anticipated
that speech itself might become a censorial weapon, or that scarcity of attention would become such a
target of flooding and similar tactics.”); Hasen, supra note 9, at 23 (“But there is a danger that
counterspeech will not be enough to deal with the flood of bot-driven fake news making it harder for
voters with civic competence to separate truth from fiction and make informed voting and policy
choices. For this reason, the First Amendment should not be interpreted to bar the government from
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upon which listeners often rely to gauge a message’s quality and
credibility.26 Claims to anonymity or pseudonymity (i.e., speakers’ efforts
to conceal and sometimes even lie about their expression’s actual source)
generally serve speakers’ interests at the expense of their listeners.27 In
short, the more information about the source of a message, the better for
listeners. Indeed, because the source of speech is so valuable to listeners,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld compelled disclosures—that is,
laws that require campaign contributors and speakers to disclose their
identities to the public—in the campaign speech context where it is
otherwise so loath to permit regulation.28
As many of the speakers in this Symposium emphasized, robots are
disruptive in many ways, for good and for ill.29 More specifically, the
cheap and plentiful speech that robots help make possible can disrupt
democratic institutions (again, for both good and for ill) and will likely
disrupt First Amendment doctrine as well.30 Just as criminal and tort law
will respond to the new ways in which robots cause harm, so too will First
Amendment doctrine respond to the new challenges generated by robotic
speech. Recall that the First Amendment doctrine of the early twenty-first
century is almost unrecognizable from the First Amendment doctrine of
the early (and even the late):31 change will come, even if we are not yet
sure what form it will take.

enacting carefully drawn laws which would require social media and search companies such as
Facebook and Google to provide certain information to let consumers judge the veracity of posted
materials.”).
26. See Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88
B.U. L. REV. 587, 592–97 (2008) (describing how individuals use the source of speech as a heuristic
for its credibility or lack thereof).
27. Helen Norton, Secrets, Lies, and Disclosure, 27 J.L. & POL. 641, 644 (2012) (“[S]ome
political speakers seek to shape their listeners’ voting behavior by denying those listeners information
about the source of the message or of the candidate’s (or cause’s) financial support—information that
is not only indisputably true but also of great interest and value to listeners.”). I acknowledge a few
exceptions, for example: listeners’ interests are served by anonymity for speakers who reasonably fear
retaliation for whistle-blowing or other speech about government and other misconduct that is of great
value to listeners. See id. at 642–43.
28. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010) (“[D]isclosure
permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This
transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different
speakers and messages.”).
29. Annette Clark, Dean, Seattle University School of Law, Opening Remarks at the Seattle
University Law Review Symposium: Singularity: AI and the Law (Feb. 17, 2018).
30. See Massaro, Norton & Kaminski, supra note 3, at 2506–23 (describing doctrinal and policy
challenges, which include determining when robots can sue or be sued and distinguishing robotic
conduct from speech for First Amendment purposes).
31. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME: FROM THE
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 533 (2004) (describing substantial changes in
First Amendment doctrine over time).
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And perhaps the challenges of robotic speech will inspire and enable
a return to a truly listener-centered approach to some of these challenges
in other, more traditional settings. As many thoughtful commentators have
observed, although the commercial speech doctrine originally sought to
privilege listeners’ interests as consumers, commercial and other speakers
now increasingly exploit that doctrine to attack regulations intended to
protect listeners from speakers who enjoy advantages of power and
information over them.32 Examples include powerful speakers’ challenges
to privacy laws that constrain commercial entities’ use of information for
marketing purposes and challenges to laws that require corporate and
commercial actors to make certain truthful disclosures.33 As my co-authors
and I earlier suggested, “[t]he prospect of free speech rights for strong AI
speakers might encourage useful clarification of the roles of human
listeners and of speech harms in U.S. free speech theory and doctrine
today.”34

32. E.g., Alan B. Morrison, No Regrets (Almost): After Virginia Board of Pharmacy, 25 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 949, 952–53 (2017) (“I had hoped that, as the commercial speech doctrine
developed, the utility of the information to the consumer would be part of the balance, instead of
simply asking whether the challenged statements were truthful.”); Tamara Piety, “A Necessary Cost
of Freedom”? The Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012) (“Sorrell completes
what has been a decades-long process of turning the rationale for commercial speech doctrine upside
down by putting the speaker, rather than the public interest, at the center of the analysis. It completes
what I call has been a ‘bait-and-switch’ whereby the protection for commercial speech was offered
under one justification, but once it was granted, has morphed into something completely different.”).
33. See Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant
Libertarian Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1395–96 (2017) (asserting that the
contemporary Court’s approach to free speech problems has included a significant and potentially
damaging change in its concept of “listeners”) (“In the republican tradition, listeners are a stand-in for
the public, whose interest in free expression is to achieve collective self-determination and selfgovernment . . . . Leaving this tradition behind, the Court’s new approach narrowly conceived of
listeners as individual consumers or voters whose interest in free expression is to make informed
choices in the market for goods or candidates . . . . [L]isteners’ rights are subordinated to corporate
speech rights. It is deeply ambiguous whether the Court’s deregulatory holdings actually benefit
listeners, though corporate interests are always served.”).
34. Massaro, Norton & Kaminski, supra note 3, at 2523; see also id. at 2514 (predicting that
these challenges “may inspire more careful reflection about how to define and mitigate the harmful
effects of covered speech, while preserving its manifold benefits”).

